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Abstract
This paper exploits the effect of massive refugees flows to the Greek islands on natives’
political attitudes. Our results show a significant effect of refugees’ presence on xenophobia.
This outcome is robust under FE estimates and IV strategies. Furthermore the particular
context of our study and the timing of the elections allow us to dismiss anti-immigration
votes being casted for different motives than purely xenophobic reactions.
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1 Introduction
The political instability of Middle East has prompted the largest flow of refugees in Europe
since WWII. An estimated 856,723 people crossed the Mediterranean sea in 2015 to reach Eu-
rope via Greece and applied for political asylum. Meanwhile, we have witnessed a rise of
nationalist and anti-immigration parties, as epitomized by the successful BREXIT campaign.
While the rise of extreme right parties is not a new phenomenon in Europe (Arzheimer 2009),
the trend does seem to have accelerated in more recent years thereby raising the question of
whether massive refugees flows can affect the political choices of natives in European coun-
tries. To address this question, we explore the effect of the unprecedented wave of refugees to
the European Union on two parliamentary electoral results in Greece in January and September
2015.
Immigration - especially when the flow of migrants is important - has been shown to gen-
erate anti-immigration feelings (Hopkins 2010, Dustmann et al. 2011). The channels explaining
this phenomenon are multiple. Anti-immigration attitudes are explained by both economic
factors such as labour market competition (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Mayda 2006, O’Rourke
and Sinnott 2006, Facchini and Mayda 2009) and the impact of immigration on the fiscal bur-
den (Dustmann and Preston 2007, Facchini and Mayda 2009, Dahlberg et al. 2012), and non-
economic factors rooted in cultural values and beliefs (see e.g. Arzheimer 2009, Hainmueller
and Hopkins 2014, Barone et al. 2016).
Most of the existing literature points at the positive effect of immigration on negative atti-
tudes towards migrants and refugees by using a series of instruments to overcome endogeneity
concerns (e.g. Halla et al. 2012, Harmon 2014, Mayda et al. 2015, Barone et al. 2016, Steinmayr
2016). The context of our study is unique and enables us to improve the identification of the
impact of refugees flows on policy opinions. We exploit two electoral rounds (January and
September 2015), that were 8 months apart, and where - more importantly - the second elec-
tion was neither caused by the refugee flow, nor was anticipated by voters or political parties.1
1The September 2015 elections were the consequence of a referendum over the bailout terms imposed on the
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Importantly, over the period separating the two electoral rounds, Greece witnessed a massive
refugee flow. A second distinctive feature of our study is that after refugees massively migrated
to the Greek islands, further movement proved extremely complicated as explained below. A
third feature of our study is our use of an instrument taken from the recent migration litera-
ture (see Beine et al. 2013, Docquier et al. 2016) based on a gravity model predicting the stock
of refugees out of a set of reasonably exogenous dyadic variables interacted with time dum-
mies. These features enable us to improve on the existing literature by proposing a convincing
identification strategy.
In the next section we review the current refugee crisis, and explore the migratory paths
from Turkey to Europe via Greece. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 contains our empirical
findings, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The background
2.1 The refugee crisis
In 2015 alone, more than a million refugees are estimated to have reached Europe (Interna-
tional Organization for Migration), mainly by sea (97%) and mostly transiting via the Turkish
shores to the Greek islands (82%), before pursuing their journey through the Balkans towards
northern Europe (IOM 2015). With close to 3 million registered refugees in Turkey in April
2016 (UNHCR, 2016), most of which desire to reach Northern Europe, the predilection road for
refugees to penetrate Europe has been to be smuggled to the Greek islands. The total number
of registered arrivals of refugees in Greece in 2015 reached the record figure of 856,723, with
the bulk of the flow being directed towards the Greek islands bordering Turkey.
Once on Greek soil, the unique way for refugees to pursue their route to Northern Europe,
is by processing their papers with local Greek authorities, before embarking on vessels heading
to Athens’ port, Piraeus, or to the port of Kavala. This unprecedented flow of migrants created
Greek government.
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a bottleneck on the Greek islands where local authorities struggled to screen and record the
migrants, while Ferry companies reached capacity constraints on board of their vessels. The
combination of these features makes our study unique: first, this flow of refugee has translated
in a permanent presence of refugees on the Greek islands during the time span covered by
this study and, second, natives were conscious that refugees would not remain on their islands
in the long run, hence dismissing any economic motivation for voting in favour of an anti-
immigration party.
2.2 The rise of the Golden Dawn
The heavy presence of refugees on the Greek islands has coincided with an increase in the sup-
port for the extreme right wing party Golden Dawn. The party was founded in 1980 but has
historically been politically insignificant, securing less than 0.5% of the total votes at parlia-
mentary elections. The party gained momentum in the midst of the economic crisis scoring 7%
at the June 2012 parliamentary elections, which secured them 21 seats (out of 300) in the Greek
parliament. In the January and September 2015 electoral rounds the party renewed its electoral
success with its scores reaching, respectively, 6.3% and 7%.
Golden Dawn is known for its harsh discourse and actions against migrants, and its political
platform is deeply anti-austerity, anti-European and anti-immigration. These features have
convinced part of the Greek electorate, with the party obtaining more than 20% of the votes
in some municipalities of Athens in the May 2012 parliamentary elections. Given this clear
and loud anti-immigration discourse, the on-going refugee crisis is likely to have contributed
to strengthening the party in municipalities harbouring refugees. This is especially true given
the fact that the large media coverage of the refugee crisis may have contributed to the political
polarization of the electorate (Melki and Pickering 2014).
The unprecedented refugee flow to Greece in 2015 has disproportionally affected islands
neighbouring Turkey, thus constituting an ideal context for testing the impact of refugees’ pres-
ence on votes for an anti-immigration party. Two parliamentary elections were organized in
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Greece in 2015, in January and in September. The peculiarity of the September elections lies in
that they were totally unexpected, thus preventing political parties from strategically design-
ing electoral campaigns in advance. Moreover, the second electoral round was organized at
the end of the northern hemisphere summer period, a period of particularly intense refugee
smuggling due to favourable weather conditions. Together these facts imply that municipal-
ities close to the Turkish border had been exposed to important increases of refugee presence
prior to casting their votes in September 2015.
3 Data
Monthly data for refugees has been collected from United Nations’ archives for the years 2013,
2014 and 2015. Our database contains the number of registered refugees at the municipal-
ity level for a 3 month window preceding the two elections. The rationale for considering
such wide windows of observation lies in the constant (day-by-day) variation in the number of
refugees present on the islands, thus increasing the likelihood of encountering outliers when
considering shorter windows of observation. For robustness reasons we equally collected data
for 4-months and 7-months observation windows, respectively.2 We collected electoral data
for each municipality from the ministry of Interior for the January and September 2015 bal-
lots. Data for population, unemployment are taken from the Greek statistics service (ELSTAT)
and the crime data (thefts) for each region for the years 2014 and 2015 from the Greek police.
The travel distance (by road) from Turkey to Greek municipalities is computed as the minimal
travel distance from each Greek municipality to the closest Turkish border using geographical
coordinates, and relying on geodesic distances for the islands. Table 1 illustrates the summary
statistics for the main variables of our analysis.
2Our results remain robust to the use of 1-month or 12-months windows.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
REF3month 0.008 0.067 0 0.976
REF4month 0.009 0.07 0 0.978
REF7month 0.01 0.074 0 0.98
Golden Dawn 0.066 0.023 0 0.171
SYRIZA 0.363 0.074 0.139 0.788
New Democracy 0.309 0.078 0.047 0.679
Potami 0.049 0.03 0.006 0.43
KKE 0.054 0.031 0 0.331
ANEL 0.042 0.018 0 0.207
Centrists 0.023 0.013 0 0.112
Pasok 0.036 0.042 0 0.207
ln(unemployment) -2.99 0.848 -4.67 -0.782
ln(crime) -7.193 0.644 -8.041 -4.875
4 Empirical Methodology
4.1 Benchmark Specification
Our benchmark specification reads as:
yit = βREFit + λXit + γt + γi + eit (1)
where yi,t is the share of votes received by Golden Dawn in municipality i and year t, and
REFit is the percentage of refugees over the total population of municipality i in year t.
The coefficient of interest, β, captures the effect of the presence of refugees in a given munic-
ipality on the percentage of votes the Golden Dawn party received. To mitigate the possibility
of an omitted variable bias, we introduce time varying covariates, Xit, that include the log of
unemployment rates and the log of crime rates (thefts). To further shield our analysis from
policies specific to the islands (e.g. change in the islands’ specific tax regime) that could af-
fect political choices, we augment our model with the interaction of an island dummy with
time. Also, to capture unobserved historical heterogeneity across municipalities, we introduce
a dummy for whether the municipality elected members of Golden Dawn in the Greek par-
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liament in June 2012 (IGD). Lastly, we further capture unobserved heterogeneity by including
time (γt) and municipality fixed effects (γi). To solve the reverse causality and measurement
problems, we next propose an instrumental variables approach.
4.2 Instrumental strategy
In line with Feyrer (2009) and Alesina et al. (2016), our strategy consists in instrumenting the
stock of refugees using the predictions of a pseudo-gravity regression that includes interactions
between year dummies and the geodesic distance between each municipality of destination (i)
and the closest Turkish border (r). Identification comes from the time varying characteristics
of specific potential routes used by refugees. The predictions of bilateral migration stocks are
obtained from the following pseudo-gravity model:
ln(Stockr,i,t) = βt ln(Distancer,i) + γi + γt + ε (2)
where Stockr,i,t is the number of refugees in municipality i in year t, and r stands for the closest
Turkish border. Variables γi and γt are, respectively, destination and year fixed-effects. In the
pseudo-gravity stage, the presence of a large number of zeroes in bilateral migration stocks
gives rise to econometric concerns about possible inconsistent OLS estimates. To address this
problem, we use the Poisson regression by pseudo-maximum likelihood (see Santos Silva and
Tenreyro 2011).3 Then, we predict the stocks from the gravity model subtracting the destination
and year dummies as included in (1) to construct our instrument.4
4.3 Results
Table 2 displays the baseline estimates. Columns 1-3 contain the results when considering the
aggregate stock of refugees over 3-month, 4-month, and 7-month windows, respectively.
3The zero-stage results can be found in Table A.1.
4For robustness reasons we also develop an augmented shift-share strategy à la Ottaviano and Perri (2006) to
instrument the stocks of refugees. The results - which are available upon request - are qualitatively equivalent.
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The majority of the regressions explain more than 96 percent of the variation in the ob-
served percentage of votes received from Golden Dawn. This ensures a very good fit, given
that migration rates are very heterogeneous across corridors. The results confirm our expec-
tations: higher stocks of refugees are correlated with higher percentages for the extreme right
Golden Dawn party. The magnitude of the coefficient is relatively low: a 1 percentage point
increase in the share of refugees is associated with an increase of 0.05 percentage points for the
Golden Dawn at the elections. Also, the unemployment and crime rates are not significant at
any significance level.
Table 2: Benchmark Model
(1) (2) (3)
Golden Dawn Golden Dawn Golden Dawn
REF3month 0.0578∗∗∗
(4.29)
ln(unemployment) 0.0023 0.0022 0.0023
(0.49) (0.47) (0.50)
ln(crime) 0.0033 0.0034 0.0032
(0.57) (0.58) (0.56)
REF4month 0.0587∗∗∗
(4.37)
REF7month 0.0625∗∗∗
(4.29)
N 648 648 648
R2 0.96 0.96 0.96
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: In all tables standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and the corresponding t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
In Table 3 we explore the robustness of our results to the inclusion of two additional control
variables: a dummy taking the value 1 for municipalities which elected members of Golden
Dawn in the Greek parliament in the June 2012 elections (IGD) and that captures pre-refugee
attitudes, as well as an island-dummy capturing the effect of policies targeting the islands in
particular on electoral outcomes. The coefficient of interest remains stable throughout the vari-
ous specifications in Columns (1)-(4). In Column (5), we exclude the municipalities that elected
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members of Golden Dawn the last 4 years from our sample. Throughout the specifications, we
find that the islands coefficient is negative and significant, revealing a lower historical propen-
sity to vote for the extreme right in islands. The IGD coefficient is positive and significant, thus
reflecting a higher tendency to vote for the extreme right in municipalities where the party had
a historical presence. On the other hand, we notice that the interacted islands-time variable has
a positive and significant effect thus confirming the expectation that austerity measures that hit
disproportionally more the Greek islands pushed local populations to support increasingly the
extreme right.
Table 3: Benchmark Model: additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Golden Dawn Golden Dawn Golden Dawn Golden Dawn Golden Dawn
REF3month 0.0565∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗
(4.27) (3.48) (3.75)
ln(unemployment) -0.0009 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0068
(-0.25) (-0.27) (0.07) (0.06) (-1.61)
ln(crime) 0.0046 0.0047 0.0044 0.0045 0.0073
(0.81) (0.82) (0.85) (0.86) (0.96)
IGD 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗ 0.0116∗∗
(4.64) (4.65) (2.34) (2.35)
REF4month 0.0574∗∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗
(4.36) (3.56)
island -0.0093∗∗∗ -0.0093∗∗∗
(-7.61) (-7.60)
island*t 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗
(5.27) (5.25)
N 648 648 647 647 389
R2 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
In Table 4, we propose a falsification test. To see whether other political parties have been
affected by the refugee crisis, we substitute the percentages of votes for Golden Dawn by the
percentages of votes for the other parties that were elected in the Greek parliament. Our results
suggest that no other political party was affected by the refugee crisis, including the ruling
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coalition parties Syriza and ANEL.
Table 4: Falsification Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SYRIZA New Democracy Potami KKE ANEL PASOK Centrists
REF3month -0.0026 -0.0871 0.0062 0.0031 -0.0085 0.0230 .0052
(-0.04) (-1.38) (0.37) (0.23) (-0.32) (0.56) ( 1.03)
ln(unemployment) -0.0223 0.0261 -0.0031 0.0095∗ 0.0067 -0.0118 -.00231
(-1.09) (1.59) (-0.58) (1.84) (1.28) (-1.19) ( -0.61 )
ln(crime) 0.0153 -0.0820∗∗∗ 0.0116 -0.0094 0.0016 0.0596∗∗∗ -.00528
(0.68) (-3.04) (1.50) (-1.12) (0.17) (3.41) (-1.40)
N 646 646 646 646 646 646 646
R2 0.92 0.94 0.90 0.97 0.86 0.88 0.92
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5 presents the instrumental variable approach results. Both columns document that
the impact of the presence of refugees on the percentage of votes for the extreme-right is now
much larger and highly significant, suggesting a substantial overall downward bias in the FE
estimates. This finding highlights the fact that among the sources of biases those delivering
attenuation, such as measurement error and/or reverse causality, are likely to play a major
role. After instrumenting for the shares of refugees, we find that an increase in 1 percentage
point of the immigrant shares entails an increase in the percentage of votes for Golden Dawn
of 0.06 percentage points on average. The F-statistic is above 10, meaning that our estimates do
not suffer from the issue of weak instruments.
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Table 5: Instrumental Variable
(1) (2)
Golden Dawn Golden Dawn
REF3month 0.075∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(3.94 ) (2.96)
ln(unemployment) 0.0026 .0002367
(0.78) (0.10)
ln(crime) 0.0024 0.0044432
(0.54) (1.22)
island -.009306
(-10.89)
island*T 0.0064
(7.53)
IGD 0.01153
(3.34)
N 648 648
R2 0.95 0.96
F − test first stage 32.02 31.55
K-P F-Test† 64.47 60.5
5 Conclusion
In this study we exploit an unprecedented flow of refugees to the Greek islands during the
summer of 2015, and show that the municipalities that were more exposed to the inflow of
refugees experienced a relative increase in the share of votes for the anti-immigration party
Golden Dawn in the Greek parliamentary elections of September 2015. This unique context
that features unexpected elections at the height of the refugee crisis allows us to isolate the
effect of an increased level of xenophobia in response to the refugee presence, as opposed to
other anti-immigration mechanisms, while also shielding our sample from strategic behaviour
of political parties and of natives. Our results are supported by an instrumentation strategy
exploiting the distance of Greek municipalities to the Turkish shores, while we also control for
a host of controls capturing time-varying and time-invarying unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table A.1.: Zero-stage estimates: Gravity model à la Feyrer (2009)
(1) (2)
ln(Stocki,r,t) ln(Stocki,r,t)
ln(Distancei,r)× I2014 -0.7197*** -0.572***
(-3.23) (-2.69)
ln(Distancei,r)× I2015 -0.7043*** -0.56***
(-3.12) (-2.65)
Observations 609 609
R-squared 0.99 0.99
Year dummies Yes Yes
Destination dummies Yes Yes
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